VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism

Results: 65



#Item
41Characterizing False-name-proof Allocation Rules in Combinatorial Auctions Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, and Yuko Sakurai ∗

Characterizing False-name-proof Allocation Rules in Combinatorial Auctions Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, and Yuko Sakurai ∗

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Source URL: agent.inf.kyushu-u.ac.jp

Language: English - Date: 2016-07-21 01:26:20
42Algorithmic Mechanism Design Through the lens of Multi-unit auctions Noam Nisan  ∗

Algorithmic Mechanism Design Through the lens of Multi-unit auctions Noam Nisan ∗

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Source URL: www.cs.huji.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2014-01-21 11:29:27
43Robust Mechanisms for Risk-Averse Sellers Mukund Sundararajan Qiqi Yan∗  Google Inc.,

Robust Mechanisms for Risk-Averse Sellers Mukund Sundararajan Qiqi Yan∗ Google Inc.,

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Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com

Language: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:34
44CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #7: Multi-Parameter Mechanism Design and the VCG Mechanism∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 14, 2013

CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #7: Multi-Parameter Mechanism Design and the VCG Mechanism∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 14, 2013

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-09-22 16:31:05
45Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University JOSHUA R. WANG, Stanford University We study the problem of computing and learning non-anonymous reserve prices to maximize revenue. We first

Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University JOSHUA R. WANG, Stanford University We study the problem of computing and learning non-anonymous reserve prices to maximize revenue. We first

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Source URL: web.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2016-08-08 16:20:04
46Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms ∗ Jason D. Hartline  Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms ∗ Jason D. Hartline Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2009-05-12 00:18:06
47T HEORY OF C OMPUTING, Volume), pp. 95–119 www.theoryofcomputing.org S PECIAL ISSUE IN HONOR OF R AJEEV M OTWANI  Revenue Submodularity

T HEORY OF C OMPUTING, Volume), pp. 95–119 www.theoryofcomputing.org S PECIAL ISSUE IN HONOR OF R AJEEV M OTWANI Revenue Submodularity

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Source URL: theoryofcomputing.org

Language: English - Date: 2014-11-14 13:01:36
48Algorithmic Game Theory  Summer 2015, Week 8 Incentives vs Computation ETH Z¨

Algorithmic Game Theory Summer 2015, Week 8 Incentives vs Computation ETH Z¨

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Source URL: www.cadmo.ethz.ch

Language: English - Date: 2016-01-26 12:27:11
49CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #9: Beyond Quasi-Linearity∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 21,

CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #9: Beyond Quasi-Linearity∗ Tim Roughgarden† October 21,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-09-22 16:32:41
50Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design † ∗  Felix Fischer

Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design † ∗ Felix Fischer

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Source URL: paulduetting.com

Language: English - Date: 2012-10-30 16:18:44